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Abstract 
Irving Hallowell’s conversation with an Anishinaabe (Ojibwa) elder in the 
early twentieth century has gained increasing attention in recent decades. 
It has been cited by many involved in the multi-disciplinary ‘turns’ to 
ontology, materiality and relationality. In particular, it has inspired many 
researchers involved in the ‘new (approach to) animism’. This article 
considers efforts to rethink what ‘person’ or ‘relation’ might mean in the 
light of Indigenous ontologies and of the ferment of reflection and analysis 
offered by many colleagues. It proposes that we have not yet sufficiently 
understood what the elder intended by telling Hallowell that only some 
stones are animate. A more radically relational understanding of person-
hood has implications for the ways in which we approach and engage 
with/in nature, culture, science, and religion. 
Keywords 
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There are, we have been told, turtles all the way down. The phrase 
evokes the inherent consciousness of all matter, ‘down’ from putatively 
higher mammals to subatomic particles.  
 If the early- to mid-twentieth century ethnographer Irving Hallowell 
had known this, would he still have asked an Anishinaabe elder in 
Manitoba, Canada, whether all the stones around them were alive? Or 
would he have had asked about consciousness in Anishinaabe world-
views and ontology? Would he have wondered whether the unnamed 
elder already had some access to quantum physics and its quandaries 
about particles responding to researchers and their experimental equip-
ment? Would he have asked if the elder understood liveliness and 
consciousness to be synonymous or, in some way, distinct? Once he had 
learned that stones, asiniig, are animate in Anishinaabe grammar (the 
plural suffix –iig indicating this animacy), would he have linked the 
consciousness of matter to the animacy of stones? If so, might he then 
have summed this up as ‘turtles all the way down, stones all the way 
around’? Whatever the answers to such questions might be, Hallowell 
and his Anishinaabe hosts invite us to reflect on and debate about the 
relations of culture and nature, humanity and the larger-than-human 
world, consciousness and matter, and also religion and science. 
 In reality, Hallowell gifted us with a different complex phrase to set 
alongside ‘turtles all the way down’: that is ‘other-than-human persons’ 
(Hallowell 1960: 21 and frequently). Although this is now widely cited in 
publications and lectures by scholars from many disciplines, it deserves 
even more attention. This article begins with a précis of what Hallowell 
says about his hosts’ ontology, culture, behaviour, and worldview, 
largely unpacking what ‘persons’ might mean. The elder’s somewhat 
enigmatic answer to Hallowell’s question about the animacy of stones is 
crucial here and in the remainder of this article. Asked whether ‘all the 
stones we see around us here [are] alive?’ he replied ‘no, but some are’ 
(Hallowell 1960: 24). Having drawn attention to what Hallowell does 
with this and the notion of ‘personhood’, I then introduce recent 
discussions of animism and the related fields of the ontological, material, 
and relational turns. Noticing that although much of the ethnology 
discussed in animism-related literature harmonizes with the elder’s 
radically relational ontology, I have become exercised by the fact that 
analytical or philosophical discussions of animism tend to subsume 
‘some stones’ into nature, materiality, ceremonial objects, and other 
enveloping categories. Therefore, in the following discussion I seek 
greater clarity about scholarly ways of disciplining the unruly data 
commonly labelled ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. What interests me here is the 
role of such terms in the processes of separation and fixity, which, as 
Bruno Latour (1993) asserts, are quintessentially modern. I consider a 
range of ways in which relationships and interactions between species 
require us to think again, perhaps differently, about Hallowell’s question 
(‘are all the stones we see around us here alive?’) and the elder’s 
enigmatic answer, ‘no, but some are’.  
 Happily, I am not alone in my ambition to speak more clearly about 
animist relationality. Therefore, this article is replete with quotations 
selected from the many ongoing efforts to speak about interactive 
relationships in the larger-than-human world. These aid me to move 
towards claiming that more than the inherent relationality of living 
beings is revealed by Hallowell’s record of his conversation. Similarly, 
the mass of recent dialogue between scholars, Indigenous knowledge 
teachers, and other animists pushes beyond that point. Of greater 
importance, the more radical implication of multi-species co-dwelling 
(finding ourselves in the presence of other persons) is that to become a 
person one needs to act personably, motivated and (in)formed by locally 
appropriate etiquettes and ethics. I propose that it is not enough for 
scholars to consider this only as an ethnographic description of animist 
ontologies. We could also make use of it to advance our discussions 
about the constitution of the world and of academia beyond the 
nature/culture duality. In that context, I conclude that re-theorising 
religion as an aspect of inter-species relations might, at last, carry us 
beyond the constraints of our inherited modernist dualisms.  
Other-than-Human Persons 
Hallowell’s phrase ‘other-than-human persons’ is at the heart of his 
argument ‘that in the metaphysics of being found among these Indians 
[the northern Ojibwa or Anishinaabe], the action of persons provides the 
major key to their world view’ (1960: 20-21). This leads him to reflect on 
a wide range of information conveyed to him in conversation with his 
hosts, in observations within the community, and/or in reading previous 
publications. There is a richness even in this summary sentence that now 
seems to be prophetic of recent attention to studying lived reality, 
material and performance cultures, and personal interaction. The study 
of religions and cultures and other disciplinary pursuits have changed. 
 Hallowell’s conversation with the elder is increasingly well known but 
it rewards regular re-visitation. In the short question and answer (‘are all 
the stones we see around us here alive?’ and ‘no, but some are’) Hallowell 
presents the heart and guts of what his hosts had taught him about 
Anishinaabe worldviews. In particular, he focuses our thinking about 
personhood. He observes that ‘everyday life is so structured culturally’ 
that, in their interactions with the larger-than-human world, 
Anishinaabe ‘individuals act as if they were dealing with “persons” who 
both understand what is being said to them and have volitional capa-
cities as well’ (1960: 36). ‘Persons’ are wilfully responsive and communi-
cative. In terms that some scholars prefer, they are subjects or agents.  
 Hallowell later notes that some persons are deemed capable of 
metamorphosis, shape-shifting, or dramatically altering their appearance 
(e.g. when bears look like humans). He writes that this  
is one of the generic properties manifested by beings of the person class. 
But is it a ubiquitous capacity of all members of this class equally? I do not 
think so. Metamorphosis to the Ojibwa mind is an earmark of ‘power’. 
(1960: 39) 
Not all persons are equal. While some species appear to grow into the 
wielding of power (sometimes demonstrated by the ability to transform) 
more easily than others (eagles and bears being prime examples), others 
do so less easily. Humans are not particularly good at this, but some 
achieve the ability. They are accorded considerable respect, not solely for 
being able to metamorphose, but because that power indicates either the 
achievement of the social responsibility incumbent on elders, leaders 
and similarly venerable people, or the deceitfulness of sorcerers.  
 As his argument develops, introducing us to varied interactions 
between persons of different kinds, Hallowell explores the social and 
ethical standards expected within Anishinaabe culture. He says that  
the same standards which apply to mutual obligations between human 
beings are likewise implied in the reciprocal relations between human and 
other-than-human ‘persons’. In his relations with ‘the grandfathers’ [an 
honorific applied to elders but also to other-than-humans] the individual 
does not expect to receive a ‘blessing’ for nothing. It is not a free gift; on his 
part there are obligations to be met. There is a principle of reciprocity 
implied. (1960: 46) 
The Anishinaabe social world is shaped by responsibilities and 
obligations that are, like the constitution of those deemed to be ‘persons’, 
not determined by species or by human-likeness. Or, rather, humans 
(like other beings) are ‘persons’ when they act as the larger-than-human 
community (which always includes them) determines is appropriate 
and/or respectful. Hallowell sums this up in the concluding sentences of 
his article, saying, 
The entire psychological field in which they [the Ojibwa] live and act is not 
only unified through their conception of the nature and role of ‘persons’ in 
their universe, but by the sanctioned moral values which guide the 
relations of ‘persons’. It is within this web of ‘social relations’ that the 
individual strives for pīmädäzīwin. (1960: 48) 
Pīmädäzīwin, the good life or ‘life in the fullest sense, life in the sense of 
longevity, health and freedom from misfortune’ (1960: 45), is achieved in 
cooperation with others (not all of them human), requires reciprocal 
exchanges of gifts, and is sometimes marked by displays of power.  
 Before moving on from this highlighting of the sweep of Hallowell’s 
article, it is worth saying something about negatively valued persons. 
Those who do not share power, but instead accumulate it for their own 
ends, are deemed dangerously antisocial. Persons do not have to be 
‘good’ any more than they have to be human. However, they do have to 
deal with the expectation that they will seek to contribute to the common 
good. Even when seeking to take the life of others (e.g. in hunting or 
fishing), persons are expected to act respectfully. That they do not 
always do so is part of what makes all this more than a romantic tale of 
harmony in paradise. Rather, Anishinaabe cultural motifs have been 
worked out in the sometimes fraught interactions between persons who 
are members of distinct, sometimes competing, and sometimes edible 
species. This is an important facet of the story that Hallowell tells about 
‘Ojibwa ontology, culture, behavior and world view’.  
Revisiting Animism 
I have summarized only one of Hallowell’s publications, albeit the most 
frequently cited. In recent decades this and other works by Hallowell 
have gained increasing recognition. In introducing a special issue of the 
journal Religion in 1992, Ken Morrison offered what may serve as the 
briefest encapsulation of Hallowell’s article about ‘Ojibwa ontology’ 
(along with other scholars’ insights into Indigenous knowledges and 
lifeways) in the words ‘Person, Power, and Gift’. He asserted that these 
‘still largely unexplored existential postulates…seem to affect the 
symbolic character of Native American social, political, economic, and 
religious life’ (1992: 203). Happily, matters have improved: Person, 
Power, and Gift have gained significant and growing attention. They are, 
for example, frequent signposts in the ‘ontological turn’ and in the 
flourishing of Indigenous Studies globally. As significantly, interest in 
such matters has been a central feature of renewed consideration of 
animism.  
 The publication of ‘“Animism” Revisited: Personhood, Environment, 
and Relational Epistemology’ by Nurit Bird-David in 1999 signalled the 
growth of these ‘turns’ (although the article does not use this term). Bird-
David begins with the statement that ‘[t]he concept of animism, which 
E.B. Tylor developed in his 1871 masterwork Primitive Culture, is one of 
anthropology’s earliest concepts, if not the first’ (1999: S67). However, 
after surveying the appearance of the term in a wide range of 
publications, she notes that ‘the ethnographic referent—the researchable 
cultural practices which Tylor denoted by the signifier/signified of 
“animism”—has remained a puzzle’ (1999: S68). Indeed, she cites 
Philippe Descola’s assertion (1996: 82) that identifying such practices is 
‘one of the oldest anthropological puzzles’. In a further note, she credits 
Hallowell with having ‘come close to revisiting the notion’ of animism, 
and Stewart Guthrie (1993) with being a ‘liminal exception’ to the 
general failure to do more than cite Tylor. Bird-David’s article not only 
summarized the nascent state of debate but also drew on her research 
among the Nayaka of India to propel matters further. She corrects what 
she saw as Hallowell’s failure to explain how animistic views ‘are 
engendered and perpetuated’, noting that this was understandable given 
that cross-cultural research about ‘personhood’ was limited at the time. 
Nayaka use of the word devaru enables Bird-David to explore the ways 
in which Nayaka social space and epistemology facilitate relatedness, 
not as a thing in itself but as interactivity. This has become increasingly 
important in ongoing animism debates.  
 Around the same time, Descola’s work (1992, 1996) had begun to 
differentiate between animism, totemism, analogism, and naturalism. 
His contribution to The Handbook of Contemporary Animism (Harvey 
2013a) sets out the further development of his thinking, with reference to 
further ethnographic data and to scholarly theorizing from anthro-
pology, sociology, psychology, and other disciplines. Briefly summa-
rized, Descola envisages animism, totemism, analogism, and naturalism 
as four ways in which humans make sense of the relationship between 
‘physicality (in the sense of dispositions enabling a physical action) and 
interiority (in the sense of self- reflexive inwardness)’ (Descola 2013: 79). 
This schema has been provocative even where it has not entirely been 
followed by others. For example, Marshall Sahlins argues that Descola’s 
‘animism, totemism, and analogism are but three forms of animism, 
namely communal, segmentary, and hierarchical’ (2014: 281), while 
Johannes Neurath demonstrates (2015) that the Huichols (Wixarika) of 
Western Mexico are adept at ‘combining animistic and analogist 
tendencies’ but may not go so far as to require us to use Michael Scott’s 
(2007) term ‘polyontology’. It contributes importantly to ongoing 
consideration of the relations between, for example, materiality and 
interiority, ontology and epistemology, modernity and Indigeneity.  
 Tim Ingold’s prolific interventions about the world and the ways in 
which people move through it also contribute to revisiting animism. 
They include ethnographies of hunter-gather and farmer relations with 
other species (e.g. Ingold 1996a and 1996b), efforts to refine categories 
(e.g. 1998, 2006), and reflection on materiality and weather (e.g. 2007a, 
2007b). Ingold brought much of this together in ‘Being Alive to a World 
without Objects’ (2013), a contribution to The Handbook of Contemporary 
Animism (Harvey 2013a). Insisting that ‘things’ are not mere scenery, 
backdrops to action, he concludes that ‘Animism is not about restoring 
agency to objects; it is about bringing things back to life. It gives us room 
to breathe’ (Ingold 2013: 25). In part this is a criticism of the attribution of 
a quite magical ‘agency’ to objects and other actors or inter-actors. In 
part it is a criticism of discussions of ‘materiality’ that do not engage 
with materials. In addition to reflecting on diverse ethnographic data, it 
invites scholars to re-imagine ways of working even as they consider 
what other people say, do, or might mean. Ingold’s fusion of 
phenomenology and environmentalism has indicated interesting 
directions for thinking differently and more carefully about how persons 
‘become’ through their many relational interactions.  
 The proliferation of ‘animism’-related work escapes brief summaries, 
particularly as it continues to produce new conference presentations, 
publications, insights, and discussions. Much of this ferment cross-
fertilizes and creates new hybrids, some taking up the challenge of 
revisiting other terms (and the phenomena they purport to identify), 
such as ‘totemism’ (Rose 1998; Pedersen 2001), ‘shamanism’ (Harvey 
2003, 2010), and ‘fetishism’ (Graeber 2005; Hornborg 2011; Whitehead 
2013). Two collections of new writing that have extended the range of 
cultural contexts in which animism has been debated are particularly 
worth consulting: Ernst Halbmayer’s special issue of the journal Indiana 
(2012)—which brings Amazonian and Siberian material into dialogue—
and my Handbook of Contemporary Animism (2013a) with forty contri-
butions. Mentioning these publications is not intended to exhaust the 
summary of what has been happening or to suggest that there is no more 
to be said. It does, however, indicate some of the topics that have become 
central, along with some of the main ways in which this debate intersects 
with others.  
Turning Ontological 
A radical disruption of business-as-usual in the study of ‘other’ cultures 
was provided by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s effort to reveal plural 
ontologies rather than epistemologies. That is to say, where many 
previous scholars had managed the diversity of ways of perceiving the 
world, and thereby made some sense of the diversity of cultures, in 1999 
Viveiros de Castro invited colleagues to take seriously Amazonian 
‘perspectivism’. For his Indigenous hosts, the problem was not the 
multiplicity of cultures but of natures. A single culture was evident to 
them in the activities of all animate beings (sometimes including made 
things, cultural artifacts, but certainly including jaguars, peccaries, and 
other familiar forest-dwellers). It was the difference of bodies that 
created the diversity of perspectives. Amazonia, as Viveiros de Castro 
presented this regional perspective to others, contrasted with the Euro-
global dominant understanding of having a multinaturalism rather than 
a multiculturalism. Amiria Salmond says that the direct inspiration of 
Viveiros de Castro’s manifesto, 
drawing on writings of Bruno Latour, Marilyn Strathern, and Roy Wagner, 
among others, [is] the idea that a ‘turn toward ontology’ might be 
underway in anthropology was set in motion by the volume Thinking 
through things: Theorizing artefacts in ethnographic perspective (Henare 
[Salmond], Holbraad, and Wastell 2007), and was swiftly picked up by 
other commentators. (2014: 161) 
She goes on to summarize that book as showing that  
the proper subjects of ethnographic treatment are not necessarily (just) 
people, but may turn out to be all manner of unexpected entities, relations, 
and beings. They may include, for instance, artifacts of a kind we might 
intuitively think of as objects—only to find them playing subject-like roles: 
wood carvings that are ancestors; powerful powder; collections that make 
sense of catastrophes; and so on. (Salmond 2014: 167)  
This is the essence of the ontological turn. As with other ‘turns’ it is not 
entirely new but more of a more determined, more popular, and perhaps 
more ambitious project than earlier engagement with the life of things 
had been. Important work from before Thinking Through Things includes 
Daniel Miller’s Materiality (2005) and Latour and Peter Weibel’s exhi-
bition catalogue, Making Things Public (2005). Victor Buchli’s Material 
Culture Reader (2002), a collection of previously published work, illus-
trates the availability of discussion and the establishment of a debate by 
that date. Indeed, the publication of the Journal of Material Culture since 
1996 and of Material Religion since 2005 show that the ‘turn’ was well 
established. It is, however, undoubtedly true that Thinking through Things 
signalled a more robust emphasis on the ‘subject-like roles’ of objects. 
Just as some discussions of ‘materiality’ hardly touch ‘matter’ and some 
discussions of ‘embodiment’ are more about ideas than about corpore-
ality, so it took books like Thinking through Things to truly keep matter in 
focus as more than symbols or representations of cognitive issues or 
beliefs.  
 The ‘material turn’ in multiple disciplines has now enabled a more 
determined engagement with the relations between humans and other 
physical social actors. These can include artifacts, as Salmond noted, as 
well as ‘natural’ objects. In part, this explains the re-visitation to the term 
‘fetish’ alongside new work about animism, totemism, and shamanism. 
However, precisely the question of whether to place an object in the 
‘natural’ or the ‘artifact’ category now becomes more urgent. At stake is 
the constitution of the world. Both ontology and the relations between 
those whose dwelling together comprises the world become uncertain. 
Revisiting Nature 
One simple response to the proliferation of data (let alone the 
theorization) presented in debates about the new animism (new in 
relation to Tylor’s older approach) is to subsume all stones within the 
animate category. Indeed, if Tylor’s animists could be accused of 
believing that everything has a spirit, so Hallowell cites Diamond 
Jenness as saying that ‘To the Ojibwa…all objects have life’ (Hallowell 
1960: 49, citing Jenness 1935: 21). However, Hallowell rejects this as a 
gross over-generalization, noting that ‘If this were true, their inanimate 
grammatical category would indeed be puzzling’. However enigmatic 
the elder’s thoughtful response, ‘no, but some are’ may seem, it rejects the 
elegant option of attributing life or animacy to all stones. Animism and 
life are more complex than this.  
 In other research, some artifacts are also revealed to be treated as 
animate, other-than-human persons, in some cultures. Indeed, anyone 
who has ever sworn at their computer or their car could be said to be 
doing something animistic. In addition, certain artifacts might be classed 
as animate only sometimes—in this respect, at least, made things are not 
that different to stones among the Anishinaabe. Zuni koko masks are 
always ‘persons’, even when made by non-Zuni under the false 
impression that it is possible to make replica-koko masks (Altieri 2000). 
However, a Zuni prayer-stick is ‘given life by its maker and by the 
sacrificial gifts of grandfather turkey, the eagle, the birds of summer, and 
cotton woman’ (Fulbright 1992: 226). They become persons in the 
process of gift exchange relational activities. Further examples could be 
offered that demonstrate that animists do not think of all objects (natural 
or artifactual), in all circumstances, as living persons.  
 Even if, however, we have not completely resolved the issue of ‘what 
is alive’, the question of whether animists distinguish categorically 
between ‘natural’ and ‘made’ objects also challenges nature/culture 
dichotomies. From among the many people who have contributed to 
rethinking such cultivated matters, allow me to quote a few highlights, 
with apologies to the many other colleagues who might have been cited. 
 Donna Haraway’s diverse provocations of new thinking-and-
becoming include work about human relations with technologies and 
with other animals. These can be exemplified by or coded in terms like 
cyborgs and companion species (e.g. Haraway 1991, 2003). In a lecture to 
the European Graduate School she summed up much of her thinking by 
saying: 
The kinship system includes the companion species, the cyborg, the 
genetically modified organisms, and the various kinds of entities out of 
which entire ways of life explode. I tend to think in terms of kinship 
systems more than oppositions. It is a kinship system that does damage to 
our notions of nature, surely, but also to our notions of culture, so that 
neither nature nor culture emerges unscathed from our meditations on 
these modes of being. Nature-culture ends up being one word. Humans 
invented neither nature nor culture, therefore social constructionism as a 
strategy of analysis ends up being kind of anemic and nutritionally 
deficient. (Haraway 2000) 
More recently, she has insisted that:  
Approaches tuned to ‘multi-species becoming with’ [or ‘sympoiesis’ rather 
than ‘autopoiesis’] better sustain us in staying with the trouble on Terra. 
An emerging ‘new new synthesis’ in trans-disciplinary biologies and arts 
proposes string figures tying together human and nonhuman ecologies, 
evolution, development, history, technology, and more. Corals, microbes, 
robotic and fleshly geese, artists, and scientists are the dramatis personae 
in this talk’s SF game. (Haraway 2015: ix) 
Philippe Descola’s reflections on the putative domains of nature and 
culture led him to conclude that  
there was no need to presuppose some original fault lines in this network 
of discontinuities, in particular one that would separate the realm of nature 
from the abode of speaking creatures; I found that, however useful this 
constitutional division may have been in triggering the accomplishments 
of modernity, it has now outlived its moral and epistemological efficiency, 
thus making way for what I believe will be a new exciting period of 
intellectual and political turmoil. (Descola 2013: 90-91)  
This belief is a current in the flow of ongoing work that might be 
identified as the ‘ontological turn’ but also animates some of the best 
ecological and/or environmentalist ferment.  
 However, none of this would have been a surprise if we (scholars and 
others) had learnt respectfully from Indigenous people (among others). 
For example, there is, in the end, little difference between the Zuni who 
make and use prayer-sticks and the physicists who make and use 
quantum microscopes. That is, it is precisely the fact of made-ness, 
following careful thought and experimental refinements, that makes a 
prayer-stick and a microscope trustworthy. Centuries of prejudice 
against fetishists and their fetishes (‘mere objects’ perhaps) or idolaters 
and their idols (things ‘made with human hands’ as the refrain goes) 
may have made this similarity hard to see (a point made by Latour 2010, 
among others). Perhaps, too, somewhat fewer centuries of polemical 
marginalization of ‘religion’ as a private and personal concern has 
obscured the similarity between religious practices and other 
relationships with the larger-than-human world. That is a point to which 
I will return towards the conclusion of this article. It is, of course, the 
centuries of genocide that have prevented any sustained effort by 
‘Western’ people to learn respectfully from Indigenous people.  
 Larger-than-Human Worlding 
Having told a version of an Indigenous creation story and a version of 
the Christian creation story, Thomas King notes that in the former ‘the 
universe is governed by a series of co-operations—Charm [the name he 
gives to the first woman in the world as he tells the story], the Twins 
[Charm’s creative babies], animals, humans—that celebrate equality and 
balance’ (King 2003: 23-24). Later in his story-telling he considers ‘the 
intimate relationship that Native people [have] with the land’. He says, 
And here I am not talking about the romantic and spiritual clichés that 
have become so popular with advertisers, land developers, and well-
meaning people with backpacks. While the relationship that Native people 
have with the land certainly has a spiritual aspect to it, it is also a practical 
matter that balances respect with survival. It is an ethic that can be seen in 
the decisions and actions of a community and that is contained in the 
songs that Native people sing and the stories they tell about the nature of 
the world and their place in it, about the webs of responsibilities that bind 
all things. Or, as the Mohawk writer Beth Brant put it, ‘We do not worship 
nature. We are part of it’. (King 2003: 113-14, citing Brant 1990: 119)  
Neither King nor Brant place Indigenous people within ‘nature’ in the 
same way that the ideologues of European-colonial-modernity did (or 
do). They do not mean the innocent naked animal-like beings of 
Columbus’ rhetoric. Nor do they evoke the ‘red in tooth and claw’ 
nature of Alfred Lord Tennyson and Richard Dawkins. Rather, they 
meant the cultural larger-than-human world in which humans share 
responsibilities with all other persons (of whatever species) for co-
creating and reciprocal caring for a multi-species community.  
 This larger-than-human world, nature-culture, or, more simply, world 
or community, is the same as that of Aboriginal Australian ‘totemism’ in 
Debbie Rose’s (1999) terminology. It is a place where all species have 
‘their own rituals and law, and…they too [alongside humans] take care 
of relationships of well-being’ among all the inhabitants of an area or 
‘country’. By virtue of co-habitation, all beings are related and therefore 
share rights and responsibilities, and are expected to be committed to 
and concerned for each other’s ‘flourishing in the world’ (Rose 1999: 7, 
11).  
 This is also the world in which Val Plumwood discovered that 
crocodiles police inappropriate behaviour, or (knowingly) being in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. In an article originally entitled ‘Being 
Prey’ and now more prosaically named ‘Surviving a Crocodile Attack’ 
(2000), Plumwood writes powerfully of the place of humans in a food 
chain that does not benefit us. Her experience of ‘being prey’ provided 
her with a perspective that enriches her life-long contributions to 
environmental philosophy and (or as) eco-feminism and activism. 
 Another way of speaking about the way in which the world is both 
made of encounters and also shaped in stories or story-telling is offered 
in Anna Tsing’s discussion of ‘worlding’. She says: 
worlding is simultaneously orienting and disorienting. Worlding is always 
practiced in relation; worlds come into being at the encounter—and at best 
they explain the encounter. (2011: 63) 
Elsewhere she provides the vital insight that it is particular kinds of 
encounters that are vitalizing, producing movement, action, and effect. 
She calls these ‘friction’, noting that  
A wheel turns because of its encounter with the surface of the road; 
spinning in the air it goes nowhere. Rubbing two sticks together produces 
heat and light; one stick alone is just a stick. (Tsing 2004: cover)  
All of these efforts to speak (differently) about the world arise because of 
an increasingly well-received view that to be alive and/or to be or 
become a person requires acts of relationship.  
Relationality, Relations, and Relating 
All life is necessarily and inescapably related. Whether we learn this 
from Indigenous refrains such as the one that structures sweat-lodge 
ceremonial ‘all our relations’, or from the ‘tree of life’ diagrams 
produced by evolutionary and ecological scientists makes little 
difference. The fact is that we humans are related. The question is how 
we might relate. Our relationality is not in doubt but the appropriateness 
of our relating is questionable.  
 In 1999, Bird-David experimented with various ways of speaking 
about the relationality that constitutes persons. For example, she 
considered Marilyn Strathern’s (1988) notion of the ‘“dividual” (a person 
constitutive of relationships)’ (1999: S68). More recently she has 
expressed a preference for speaking of ‘relatives’ or ‘relations’ rather 
than of ‘persons’ or any more difficult term (Bird-David 2015). That is, in 
common with others who have tried to convey what new approaches to 
animism might entail for understanding the nature of personhood or of 
ontology, Bird-David has found that her audiences often respond badly 
to words like ‘person’ except as a reference to humans. ‘Relatives’, 
perhaps, also requires explanation if it is to serve as a reference to other-
than-human relations.  
 The assumption that humans are being spoken of when anyone says 
‘person’ or ‘relations’ is paradoxically revelatory of both positive and 
negative concerns. Negatively: the assumption separates humans into a 
unique category that undermines efforts to understand both evolu-
tionary and ethical ways in which we are, in reality, related. Positively, 
at least as a thought experiment, the fact that terms like ‘person’ and 
‘relative’ are assumed to refer to humans is indicative of the fact (true for 
all species) that some relations are closer than others. That is, humans 
typically have closer relations with other humans than with the vast 
majority of other species we might encounter. The ‘frictions’ that ener-
gize our relationships and our becoming are most often with those of our 
own species or with those of close companion species (which perhaps 
includes cyborgs and those things we call possessions). Perhaps this is 
most true of our conscious acts of relating. After all, the bacteria who 
dwell in our guts and on our skin are intimate relatives. Without them 
we would certainly not be humans or alive but we rarely pay them 
conscious attention.  
 The ethnographies that have established the viability of the new 
animism’s reflections on what it means to be a person or relation have 
consistently circulated around the fact that some relations (persons or 
frictions) are closer than others. The elder who spoke to Hallowell about 
the animacy of ‘some stones’ demonstrated (reflectively and discursively) 
that while all stones might be theoretically animate, only some stones had 
active relationships with some humans. The Anishinaabe cultural 
assumption (worldview or ontology) is that persons (of whatever 
species) move through a world of other persons. Some of those persons 
are more closely related. Some are of more importance to the life-long 
becoming that is the ambition to live a ‘good life’.  
 A similar point is made by Ken Morrison in discussing early 
encounters between Europeans and Algonkians. In The Solidarity of Kin 
(2002) he examines the ways in which both communities understood and 
misunderstood the other, rooted in divergent or conflicting cultural 
assumptions. He reprised and summarized this in opening his ‘proposal 
for a post-Cartesian anthropology’ by contrasting the typical European 
(‘first contact’ and anthropological) question ‘Are they human?’ with the 
typical Native American question ‘are these newcomers [Europeans] 
persons?’ (2013: 38-39). As with the Anishinaabe, the accumulation of 
power and (other) goods rather than the sharing of gifts identifies beings 
as anti-social in a world in which everybody is always socializing in one 
way or another. It is, then, the way in which someone (of whatever 
species) acts that indicates their personhood. In this context, a statement 
to the effect that being a person is about relating would not be a 
statement about given facts, about nature, but about etiquette and ethics. 
Finding the appropriate local way to share, to give, and to receive gifts, 
is what makes someone recognizable as a person. This could mean some-
thing as basic as knowing whether tobacco or beer is an appropriate gift, 
but it might also involve knowing whether gift-exchanges (reciprocity) 
or the one-way process of offering or receiving free gifts is expected. 
Neurath’s (2015) discussion of the complex shifting patterns and 
performances of ritual relations among the Huichol (Wixarika)—in 
which both reciprocity and free-gift dynamics can be engaged—is 
enlightening here. 
Religion in a Relational World 
Morrison drew important conclusions about religion from Hallowell’s 
work, saying:  
Hallowell locates Native American religious thought and behavior in the 
freighted dialogue of various types of personal beings. Hallowell relocates 
the religious in the actual relationships which constitute the everyday 
world. Hallowell also anticipates recent understandings that have come to 
recognize that Native American life proceeds in terms of a gifting principle 
which shapes the ethical character of both tribal and cosmic life. Human 
and other-than-human mutuality can thus be understood as both the social 
and cosmic ideal, and the goal of ritual action. In all these ways, Hallowell 
points to the possibility of understanding Native American religious 
realities in the ways in which they are grounded in the interpersonal 
engagement of human and other-than-human persons. (Morrison 2000: 35-
36) 
I have become increasingly convinced that this is true not only of Native 
American religious traditions, and not only of Indigenous religions 
elsewhere, but also of almost everything that ought to be subsumed 
within the category ‘religion’. In contrast with the modernist project of 
curtailing the referential utility of the term (keeping it for privatised and 
interiorized pursuits separate from politics, citizenship, and other 
‘public’ matters), I have joined those who argue for more relational, 
everyday, embodied, and material definitions and approaches (Harvey 
2013b). For instance, I cite the inspiration of Te Pakaka Tawhai’s 
statement that ‘the purpose of religious activity here is to…do violence 
with impunity’ (2002 [1988]: 244). That is, religious activity is about 
acting appropriately towards other-than-human persons in order to gain 
what is necessary to feed and shelter relations and guests. The precise 
form of ceremonial expression, etiquette, or ethics may be local and non-
transferable. However, the general point stands: religion is a way in 
which humans engage with our other-than-human relatives in the 
larger-than-human world.  
 All this being so, we can and should find better ways of speaking 
about the world, about religions, and about persons than the exhausted 
terms that separate nature from culture, humans from other-than-
humans, religion from politics, thought from action, and so much more. 
The experimentalism and empiricism of Anishinaabe and other Indige-
nous this-worldly, located religious life invite a renewed engagement 
with the animism that Viveiros de Castro has called ‘the only sensible 
version of materialism’ (Haraway 2015: ix). More than that, this animism 
invites a renewed engagement with nature, culture, religion, and science. 
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